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Abstract: 
 
According to a conservative estimation by the World Health Organization, 1.2 billion 
people lack access to sufficient quantities of safe water, and 2,6 billion people are without 
adequate sanitation. Consequently, 80 percent of all illnesses in the developing world are 
estimated to be the result of waterborne diseases claiming the lives of 1,8 million children 
every year. This paper investigates to what extent this problem is related to the quality of 
government (QoG) institutions. Two different water quality measures are used – one 
measuring ecosystem water quality and another measuring access to safe drinking water. 
The central question is if there is an independent effect of quality of government besides 
the effects of democratic rule and good economic resources. The results are that for 
ecosystem water quality, we could not fine that QoG had an independently positive effect. 
However, this result may have to do with the low quality of available data from many 
poor countries. Taking into consideration the interaction effect between QoG and 
economic prosperity, however, we find that there is an independent effect of government 
effectiveness on the access to safe drinking water, especially in poor countries. 
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Lack of Safe Water, Quality of Government and Cholera 
 
On June 16, 2006, the world leading daily newspaper The New York Times had a front-page 
article about Angola. The article is introduced by a large picture showing two young boys and 
one young girl  - a fair guess is that they are about ten years old-  fetching water at a stream 
that runs through what looks like an incredibly large garbage dump. The article starts with the 
following words: “In a nation whose multibillion dollar oil boom should arguably make its 
people rich enough to drink Evian, the water that many in this capital depend on goes by a 
less fancy name: Bengo. The Bengo River passes north of here, its waters dark with grits, its 
banks strewn with garbage”. The article goes on describing how poor Angolans living in the 
slums of the capital Luanda have no other option than to use the polluted water from the 
Bengo river and that this is the reason for why one of the worst cholera epidemics to strike 
Africa has occurred that has sickened over 43.000 people and killed more than 1.600 since its 
outbreak in February that year. Cholera typically spreads through contact with contaminated 
water and according to the article, this problem is everywhere in Luanda’s slums. As the 
picture shows, “children stripped to their underwear dance through sewage-clogged creeks 
and slide down garbage dumps on sleds made of sheet metal into excrement-fouled puddles”. 
The article continuous by stating that economists say that the oil-boom has resulted in a 
situation where the Angolan government have a huge budget-surplus and more money than 
they can spend and yet they seem unable to provide the population with such a basic thing as 
safe water and sanitation that would make the Cholera epidemic preventable. The article 
concludes by citing experts from various international organizations who argue that the 
situation is caused by two factors – the lack of infrastructure and huge influx of people to the 
capital due to the civil war that ended in 2002 and the high level of corruption.   
 
 
Water and the Quality of Government: A Changing Agenda 
 
When the leading international anti-corruption organization Transparency International 
published its annual Global Corruption report for 2008, the specific focus in the report as well 
as the title was “Corruption in the Water Sector”. The report contains no less than twenty-
three chapters covering more than one hundred pages analyzing this specific connection 
between corruption and the provision of safe water. In addition, a semi-public international 
 organization about this specific problem was established in 2006 called the Water Integrity 
Network funded by grants from the international development authorities in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.1 In addition to policy initiatives, this network brings 
together anti-corruption civil society movements and water professionals. Thus, both in media 
and in leading policy and advocate organizations, there is an increasing apprehension that lack 
of safe water is a major obstacle to human well-being and population health in the world and 
that this problem is to a large extent caused by factors that can be defined as the quality of 
government (QoG) issues (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). A number of studies have shown a 
correlation between environmental protection in general and factors related to the structure or 
quality of political institutions (Jahn 1998; Morse 2006; Welsch 2004). And asked to review 
the lessons of the World Bank policies for alleviating poverty in developing countries, 
Lawrence Summers – former Chief Economist of the World Bank, President of Harvard 
University and currently the Director of the White House´s National Economic Council under 
President Barak Obama – have argued that “an overwhelming lesson that I think we have 
learned in the 1990s is… the transcendent importance of the quality of institutions and the 
closely-related questions of the efficacy of political administration” (ctied in Besley and 
Ghatak 2007). 
 
The magnitude of the quality of government (henceforth QoG) problem regarding the specific 
issue of people’s access to safe water can be illustrated by the following example. According 
to a conservative estimation by the World Health Organization, 1.2 billion people lack access 
to sufficient quantities of safe water, and 2,6 billion people are without adequate sanitation. 
Consequently, 80 percent of all illnesses in the developing world are estimated to be the result 
of waterborne diseases claiming the lives of 1,8 million children every year (UNDP 2006). A 
conservative estimate is that 12.000 people die every day from water and sanitation related 
illnesses (Cunningham and Cunningham 2008; Krause 2009; Postel and Mastny 2005; 
Stålgren 2006a).  This enormous problem is by an increasing number of experts in the area no 
longer seen as an engineering problem, that is, it is not lack of technical solutions (pumps, 
reservoirs, dams, etc.) that is the main obstacle for why such large numbers of mainly poor 
people in developing countries lack access to safe water. Neither is it seen as a problem 
caused by lack of natural supply of clean water. Instead, the problem seems to be related to 
the existence of dysfunctions in the structure of the legal and administrative institutions. More 
                                                 
1 See http://www.waterintegritynetwork.net/ 
 precisely, the problem is seen as caused by lack of adequate institutions for maintenance, 
pricing and distribution of rights to land and water (Anbarci, Escaleras and Register 2009; 
Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2000; Burns and Meinzen-Dick 2000; Krause 2009; Meinzen-Dick 
2007; Sjöstedt 2008).  
 
According to the report by Transparency International mentioned above, there are an almost 
infinite number of reasons why corruption and other forms of low QoG can be detrimental to 
the provision of safe water. Among these are private companies that illegally pollute natural 
water resources and thereby destroying the ecological system which by paying bribes may 
avoid being prosecuted and punished by the justice system. Water resources management, not 
least in delicate ecosystems is often a complicated matter both technically and conceptually 
and therefore prone to be an area were different interests may collude (cf. Krause 2009; cf. 
Stålgren 2006b).  In the struggle over the use of natural water resources, kick-backs as well as 
forms of patronage and clientelistic politics may play a large role. Similarly, ordinary people’s 
lack of legally documented and guaranteed property rights to the land they use may prevent 
them from investing in necessary technical equipment (Sjöstedt 2008). Provision of safe water 
often requires huge investments in dams, water cleaning equipment and sewage systems that 
are carried out by private contractors. Public procurement for big contracts is a well-known 
source for large-scale corruption resulting in too high costs and too low quality of the 
constructions that, eventually, are put in place. For example, in India, it is estimated that more 
then 25 percent of the costs for irrigation systems are lost in bribery. Many of these 
installations are technically very complicated which is likely to increase difficulties for 
transparency in the procurement process. Petty corruption at the point of service delivery may 
deter people from using safe water and may also lead them to be reluctant to pay for water at 
all since they may suspect that the money will be stolen instead of being used for maintenance 
of the safe water equipment. This in turn may lead to water managers having far too little 
money for keeping the installations running. In some countries, this is a huge problem. For 
example, one study from India show that 40 percent of water customers had, during the 
previous six months, been making small payments to falsify meter readings so as to lower 
their water bills (Davis 2004). Similarly, a national survey in Guatemala showed that more 
than 15 percent of the population reported to have paid a bribe for getting a water connection. 
In Bangladesh and Ecuador, “private vendors, cartels and even water mafias have been known 
to collude with public water officials to prevent network extension” (Sohail and CAvill 2008, 
44). In subsidies for irrigation systems, there are also many known cases when policy 
 influence by large and strongly organized interest groups with large economic resources have 
resulted in policy outcomes that are heavily geared towards benefitting their own interests at 
the expense of “the common good” and of agents that are not so easily organized or 
economically strong. For example, a study of Mexico shows that the largest 20 percent of 
farmers get more than 70 percent of government subsidies for irrigation (Rijsberman 2008). 
 
 
A Lack of Systematic Empirical Comparative Analyses 
 
The above mentioned analyses are theoretically as well as empirically convincing in their 
claim that there is a causal link between Quality of Government (QoG) and Quality of Water 
(QoW).  In political science and environmental studies there is a debate going on about the 
effect democracy has on the environment. Some scholars claim that democracy reduces 
environmental degradation whereas others argue that this is not true and that democracy in 
fact can have a negative impact on the environment. Using different methods and data, the 
results are inconclusive since there is empirical evidence in support of both arguments 
(Karlsson et al. 2010; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002). One paper that is of direct interest 
for our argument is a study by Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2010). Their dependent variable is an 
index called Environmental Policy Stringency and as dependent variables they use two 
standard measures of democracy and corruption.2 Their question is to compare democracy 
and corruption as determinants of the stringency of a country’s environmental policy. The 
result of their analysis is that corruption is more important than democracy as an explanatory 
variable. Thus, in this analysis, democracy has a limited impact on environmental policies, 
and they argue that several other studies tend to overemphasize the importance of each 
variable. The authors conclude that it seems likely that previous empirical work have been 
overemphasizing the role of democracy for environmental policies and for environmental 
quality because of the omission of a corruption index as a control variable. Their conclusion is 
thus that reducing corruption would result in stricter environmental policies and that 
democracy on its own would not be sufficient.  
 
One problem in the existing literature is that many studies are either country specific or even 
regional/local case studies. The few comparative studies that exists have either only compared 
                                                 
2 Democracy is taken from from Polity IV, produced by ICSR of the University of Maryland and their measure 
of corruption is Transparency International Corruption Perception index from 1995 
 a relatively small set of countries or not been using various measures of Quality of Water as 
their specific dependent variable. In this study, we intend to remedy this lack of knowledge by 
analyzing data from a larger set of countries to see if, and if so how much, different QoG 
variables can explain different QoW variables.  
 
 
Cross-Country Water Quality: Basic Patterns 
 
We will begin the empirical analysis by looking at some basic cross-country bivariate 
relationships between different measures of water quality on the one hand and measures of 
quality of government, levels of democracy, and GDP per capita on the other. The data come 
from the Quality of Government open source dataset (Teorell et al. 2009). Arguably, water 
quality is one of the most important factors relevant to ecosystem health as well as to human 
health. We will use two different water quality measures – one more relevant to ecosystem 
health and another more relevant to human health. Both are taken from the underlying 
indicators behind the 2010 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) created by the Yale 
Center for Environmental Law & Policy. The measures were first applied full-scale in 2006 
and have since been updated in 2008 and in 2010. 
     
The ecosystem water quality index (WQI) concerns fresh water and is based on five 
parameters – dissolved oxygen, pH value, electrical conductivity, total nitrogen, and total 
phosphorus. Parameter measures are obtained at water monitoring stations and collected by 
UNEP/GEMS Water and European Environmental Agency (EEA) Waterbase. The human 
oriented water quality measure is based on two indicators provided by UNICEF-WHO 
combining the percentage of a country’s population with “reasonable access” to an improved 
source of sanitation and an improved source of drinking water (see also Sjöstedt 2008, p. 11-
12). The latter is defined as having as least 20 liters/person/day from a source within one 
kilometre from the dwelling (ibid. p 7). The two measures of water quality are empirically 
related to each other but the correlation is rather modest, only +.36.  
  
The quality of government measures that we employ as independent explanatory variables are 
two – the World Bank’s government effectiveness scale control of corruption index. In theory 
the two QoG-variables stand for different things. In practice, however, they are very closely 
 related with a correlation of about +.90 between them.  Levels of democracy as measured by 
Freedom House/Polity and GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002; Marshall and Jaggers 2002) are 
two obvious control variables. We know from previous research that both of them have a 
relationship with water quality (Emerson 2010). Rich democracies tend to have better water 
quality than poor non-democracies. In testing the eventual effect of quality of government on 
water quality we want to control for the known and more general effects of democracy and 
economic development. Our question is: Can we find an independent effect of quality of 
government on top of or besides the effects of democratic rule and good financial resources. 
    
The Water quality measures are updated every other year. The most recent measure is from 
2010 and covering some 195 countries. Before that there are data from 2008 and 2006. A 
rather astonishing problem we quickly came across when using the ecosystem water quality 
variable (WQI) – but not when studying the human health related water quality variable - is 
that the cross-years correlations for the WQI results were very low.3 For example, the 
correlation between the measures for 2006 and 2008 is only +.32. The comparable correlation 
for the years 2006 and 2010 is marginally higher, +.39. This means that a sizeable number of 
countries with relatively high ecosystem quality water one year have relatively bad water the 
next.  
    
However, for the two most recent measures in 2008 and 2010 the correlation is improved to 
+.67; a more decent result, but still not quite acceptable. Many countries with good ecosystem 
water 2008 have bad water 2010 and vice versa. It is difficult to believe that these rather 
dramatic changes have occurred in reality. There must be some measurement problems. And 
true enough that is what there is. As it turns out the ambitious measurements of ecosystem 
water quality based on parameter readings at monitoring stations were only possible to 
complete in 74 countries in 2010 and in 94 countries in 2008. For countries with no data 
different imputation methods were used. In plain language, educated guesses were made for 
countries with no, or no recent information on their ecosystem water quality. Furthermore, 
different imputation methods were used over the years. In 2008, for example, average 
regional imputed values were employed while in 2010 a multiple regression imputation model 
was applied. The methodology used in 2010 meant that imputed data for GDP per capita, 
BOD effluents, stringency of regulatory environment, fertilizer use, population density, 
                                                 
3 The correlation between the human related water quality variables 2008 and 2010 is +.97. For all practical 
purposes the two measurements are identical in the way they sort countries.  
 corruption of public sector, ecological footprint, and many more variables very included in 
creating the WQI-values in countries without empirical measurements. In 2010 imputed 
values were employed for 121 countries, i.e. for a sizeable majority of the cases. Real 
measures of water quality are only available for 74 countries in the 2010 version of the 
ecosystem Water Quality Index.       
    
In our analysis of ecosystem water quality we focus on the WQI data for 2010. At the end of 
the article in a special appendix eight bivariate scatter plots are published with the ecosystem 
water quality index run against the two QoG-variables (government effectiveness and control 
of corruption), the level of democracy variable and the variable measuring GDP per capita 
(log). The scatter plots come in two versions – one for all countries with some kind of WQI-
value (=195 cases), and one for the limited number of countries with real measured WQI-
values (=74 cases). 
   
Similar scatter plots are created for the relationships between the human related water quality 
variable and the two QoG measures, GDP/capita (log), and levels of democracy. These four 
scatter plots are also found in the special appendix at the end of the article.  The results for the 
analysis of ecosystem water quality are summarized in Table 1. As expected, level of 
democracy as well as GDP per capita are both positively related to ecosystem water quality 
among all countries and among countries with real measured water quality. The bivariate 
correlations are medium-sized between +.28 and +.44. Importantly, the correlations for our 
QoG-variables (government effectiveness and control of corruption) are also significant and 
positive among all countries as well as among the smaller number of countries with non-
imputed WQI-values. The correlations for the QoG measures varies between +.28 and +.51. 
  
Table 1: The Relationship Between Ecosystem Water Quality and Government 
Effectiveness, Control of Corruption, Level of Democracy, and GDP per Capita Among 
All Countries and Among Countries with Real Measured Values For Water Quality 
(Correlations (r))  
 
 All Countries 
With or Without Imputed Values  
For Water Quality 
Only Countries 
With Real Measured Values  
For Water Quality 
Government Effectiveness +.51 +.28 
Control of Corruption +.44 +.28 
GDP per Capita (Log) +.44 +.28 
Level of Democracy +.37 +.39 
Number of Countries About 180 About 85 
 
Comments: The Water Quality Index (WQI) is from 2010 and is constructed by Yale Center for Environmental Law & 
Policy. It is intended to measure water quality effects on ecosystems. The index is based on systematic measurements of five 
parameters – dissolved oxygen, electrical conductivity, pH, total phosphorus, and total nitrogen – at monitoring stations. Real 
hard measurements are obtained from about 85 countries; for another 95 countries WQI-values were imputed based on 
regression models employing around ten predictor variables (for example GDP per capita, institutions for environmental 
sustainability, control of corruption, urban population, fertilizer use, access to safe water and sanitation). The positive 
correlations mean that high water quality is related to high government effectiveness, to low levels of corruption, to high 
GDP/capita and to high levels of democracy.  
 
 
One is tempted to say, so far so good. The QoG variables are in play. They have positive 
relations with ecosystem water quality across all countries as well as among countries with 
hard measures of water quality. Now comes a tougher test. Is quality of government related to 
WQI among democratic as well as among less democratic nations and among rich as well as 
among poor countries? The question is if the QoG variables survive multi variable controls 
for level of democracy and GDP per capita (log).  
    
The answer is yes they survive and no they do not survive. The results in Table 2 reveal why 
we get two different answers. When we regress the ecosystem water quality index on the 
variables for government effectiveness, level of democracy and GDP per capita for all 
countries only the QoG measure receives a significant and positive coefficient on the .01-
level. The coefficients for level of democracy and economic development turn out to be 
positive as well but insignificant. However, in a similar regression among the smaller sample 
of countries with real measures of ecosystem water quality, the QoG variable has no 
significant effect and the coefficient even has a negative sign. The coefficient for GDP per 
capita is also non-significant while this time the effect of level of democracy is significant on 
the .05-level. 
 
 Table 2: Regressing Ecosystem Water Quality on Government Effectiveness, Level of 
Democracy, and GDP/Capita Among All Countries and Among Countries With Real 
Measured Values For Water Quality (Regr. Coeff.)  
 
 
All Countries 
Only Countries With Real Measured 
Values for Water Quality 
 regr. coeff. std. err. regr. coeff. std. err. 
Government Effectiveness  8.8***  2.5  -.3  3.2 
GDP per Capita (Log)  .2  1.5  .9  2.1 
Level of Democracy  .4  .5  1.7**  .7 
Constant  56.1***  11.8  57.7***  16.1 
Adj. R-squared  .25   .12  
 
Comments: p>/t/=.01***; =.05**; =.10*. The total number of cases is 178 in the analysis with all countries and 83 in the 
analysis with countries having real measured values for water quality. See also Table 1.  
 
 
It is not self-evident why this difference in outcome occurs. The suspicion that it has to do 
with a lack of variance and an overrepresentation of developed and democratic countries in 
the sample of nations with real measures of ecosystem water quality is only partially born out. 
Among the countries with real measured water quality about half are European and/or OECD 
countries (37), but the other half are countries from Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and Egypt for 
example), from Asia (for example Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Philippines) and from Latin-
America (Bolivia, Cuba, and Peru as examples). But it is true that among countries with 
imputed values for ecosystem water quality, most are from the less developed and less 
democratic parts of the world. For example, only 8 of them are European – Andorra, Belarus, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, Moldova, San Marino, and Ukraine. Among the other eighty 
five some thirty five are from Africa while the other fifty are from Asia, Latin-America or 
Oceania. 
  
Our main conclusion from this somewhat disappointing research endeavour into ecosystem 
water quality is threefold. First, it is a problem that the across-time data of the Environmental 
Performance Index’s biannual Water Quality Index is so shaky. The imputation methods have 
varied across years creating unreliable data across time. Second, effect analyses involving 
known explanatory variables behind good water yield very different results for the full data 
set encompassing all countries in comparison with the more limited dataset containing only 
countries with real measured ecosystem water quality. Third, quality of government variables 
can not be proven to be independently related to high ecosystem water quality. Although the 
QoG variables were independently and positively connected to ecosystem water quality in the 
 full sample of countries, they were not significantly related in the more limited sample of 
countries with real measured ecosystem water quality.  
 
Being critical empiricists we tend to give real measurements the benefit of doubt. Imputations 
we trust less. Consequently and so far our hypothesis that good government is independently 
good for good water has not been proven correct. At least not for ecosystem water quality.  
 
But what about human health related water quality? Does quality of government have an 
independent effect on people’s “reasonable access” to safe water as defined above.     
 
Table 3: The Relationship Between Water Quality (Effects on Humans) and 
Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption, Level of Democracy, and GDP per 
Capita (Correlations (r))   
 
 Correlation 
Government Effectiveness +.64 
Control of Corruption +.60 
GDP per Capita (Log) +.76 
Level of Democracy +.39 
Number of Countries About 190 
 
Comments: The variable Water Quality (Effects on Humans) is part of the 2010 Environmental Performance Index 
constructed by the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy. The variable is based on two indicators provided by 
UNICEF-WHO: The percentage of a country’s population with access to 1) an improved source of sanitation and 2) an 
improved source of drinking water. The positive correlations indicate that good water quality is related to high government 
effectiveness, to low levels of corruption, to high GDP/capita and to high levels of democracy. 
 
 
 
The results in Table 3 show a promising beginning. The relevant correlations are positive and 
stronger than the similar correlations for ecosystem water quality. Human related water 
quality is clearly related to government effectiveness as well as to control of corruption. High 
government effectiveness and low corruption is connected to good water quality for humans. 
However, good human water is also strongly related to economic development and level of 
democracy. Rich and democratic countries tend to have better water for humans than poor and 
autocratic countries.  
 
In Table 4 we control the linear effects of level of democracy and GDP/capita (log) on human 
related water quality by jointly regressing them on the water variable together with the 
government effectiveness variable. The question is if the QoG variable survives such a 
control? To play it extra safe, we have run the regression among all countries as well as 
 among non-OECD countries only. The later analysis is done to really make sure that eventual 
separate effects among poorer countries have a good chance to be detected. 
 
Table 4: Regressing Water Quality (Effects on Humans) on Government Effectiveness, 
Level of Democracy, and GDP/Capita Among All Countries and Among Non-OECD 
Countries Only (Regr. Coeff.) 
 
 All Countries Only Non-OECD Countries 
 regr. coeff. std. err.    regr. coeff. std. err 
Government Effectiveness  -.8  2.9  2.3  3.4 
GDP per Capita (Log)  14.4***  1.7  15.0***  1.8 
Level of Democracy  .3  .6  .2  .6 
Constant  -40.7***  13.6  -42.5***  14.7 
Adj. R-squared  .57    .52   
   
Comments: p>/t/=.01***; =.05**; =.10*  The number of cases is 187 for all countries and 157 for the Non-
OECD countries. See also Table 3. 
 
   
At a first glance, the results may seem a bit disappointing. There is no significant effect of 
government effectiveness on human related water quality. Not among all countries and not 
among poorer Non-OECD countries only. The only significant effect is found for economic 
development. Rich countries have the effect of providing better water than poor countries. 
And this economic variable overshadows completely the eventual linear effect of the quality 
of government variable.  However, since economic development is very strongly related to the 
quality of government variables we have a serious case of multicolinearity. It is difficult to 
distinguish between the effects of the two variables. One interesting example of that is that the 
effect of the QoG variable in Table 4 becomes highly significant if we substitute the 
GDP/capita (log) variable for an unlogged GDP/capita variable. One of the reasons for this is 
that the logged GDP/capita variable among all countries is stronger correlated with the 
government effectiveness variable (r=.83) than the unlogged version of the GDP/capita 
variable (=.73). The conclusion is that the two variables are so closely connected that it is 
very problematic to talk of separate effects.  
   
One way of not solving the problem but at least highlight the interconnectedness between 
economic development and quality of government in providing people with healthy drinking 
water is to introduce the notion of an interplay between the two and a possible interaction 
effect on human related water quality. In Table 5 we have done that by introducing an 
interaction term between GDP/capita (log) and the government effectiveness variable in our 
 model from Table 4. The idea is that it takes an interplay between money and quality rule to 
achieve access to safe water. 
 
 
Table 5: Regressing Human Related Water Quality on Government Effectiveness, 
GDP/Capita (Log), Level of Democracy, and an Interaction Term (Regr. Coeff.) 
 
 All countries Non-OECD Countries  
   regr. coeff. std. err. regr. coeff. Std. err. 
Government Effectiveness  30.8*** 8.3 26.4**  11.5 
GDP/Capita (Log)  13.5*** 1.6 14.0***  1.9 
Interaction Gov. Eff. * GDP/Capita (Log)  -3.6*** .9 -3.0**  1.4 
Level of Democracy  -.0 .5 -.0  .6 
Constant  -26.8* 13.6 -30.8**  15.0 
Adj. R-squared  .60     
 
Comments: p>/t/=.01***; =.05**; = .10*  The number of cases is 187 countries. See Table 3. 
 
                                           
Now things become clearer. To the extent that we can talk about significant effect in 
regression models with interaction terms, there is an effect of government effectiveness and 
there is a significant interaction effect. And as the coefficients indicate the effect of the QoG 
variable is especially strong among less developed countries. The effect is smaller among 
richer countries. This is an important result. It can functionally be interpreted as indicating 
that human related water quality can not only be improved with the help of money. It can also 
be improved by better quality of government. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that as with so 
many other things that are important for human well-being, quality of government matters and 
it matters for quality of water. 
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